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Introduction
Where are the boundaries of Europe?
Geographically, we all seem to have a
more or less clear-cut picture in our
minds, with the Ural as the landmark of a
continent otherwise walled by water.
When it comes to the political definition of
Europe, however, the picture starts to blur
(Wallace 1990: 7-34). Controversial dis-
cussion about the enlargement of the
European Union has indicated: (1) Geo-
graphical demarcations do not always
translate well into political ones; (2) Dif-
ferent people have different visions of the
boundaries of a European political entity.
It is often argued that Europe’s bounda-
ries are cultural – with the Christian and
secular West as a cultural unity and Tur-
key, for example, falling on the Muslim
side of a civilisational cleavage. Cultural
boundaries, however, are seldom clear-
cut and subject to both controversy and
change.
I want to approach this problem
from the constructivist and relational per-
spective of phenomenological network
theory. First, it is argued that the symbolic
construction of Europe as a ‘political
community’ is a crucial and necessary
step towards the establishment of a Euro-
pean democracy. The second section
sketches the argument that identity-
building is always relational, it involves the
construction of an Other, and the estab-
lishment of symbolic boundaries. The
European unification process can thus be
viewed as the establishment of a supra-
national political identity which vies for
control in a complex network structured by
pre-existing national identities. The third
and final section is an attempt to under-
stand the current discourse and problems
through this theoretical framework. Differ-
ent definitions of Europe are discussed
and different visions of its geo-political
spread.
Constructing a political community
“E pluribus unum” – the motto of
the US constitution, chosen by Benjamin
Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John
Adams, might well stand at the heart of
the European political integration, too. To
consolidate integrated encompassing
European institutions is only one step in
this project. A necessary parallel step is
the symbolic construction of a European
identity. The concern about the possibility
of such an identity is wide-spread (Joyce
2002). But why do we need such an iden-
tity? Why is it necessary to construct an
identity where differences prevail? Could
not the recognition of these differences
also serve as a symbolic foundation for
common political institutions?
The answer is: no. Democracy is
a highly improbable arrangement with the
construction of a ‘we’ as one of its neces-
sary conditions. Democracy needs a
‘demos’ – a collective in the name of
which decisions are taken and enforced
(Selznick 1992). This supplies political
order with the legitimacy which becomes
a crucial requirement for political institu-
tions in modernity. In medieval times,
political measures were intertwined with
the social, familial, religious, and eco-
nomic order of feudal states and thereby
enforced. With the loosening of the hier-
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archical feudal order, modernity features
the growing differentiation of politics from
the religious and economic spheres and
from everyday communication networks.
Politics now has to stand on its on feet. It
has to legitimise its measures which are
no longer backed by feudal hierarchy and
religion.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau intro-
duced the formula to solve this problem to
political theory: the ‘common good’ (1762:
40). In democratic discourse, the common
good is frequently appealed to. What the
common good might be is often subject to
dispute. Nobody has seen such a thing
yet. As with ‘justice’ and ‘scientific truth’,
the common good seems to serve as a
powerful image, a core idea for a particu-
lar discourse. In a way, the ‘common
good’ is the god of the political system
(Luhmann 2000: 118-126). Political
measures are thus regarded as legitimate
insofar as they are taken in the name of
the common good, as a result of dis-
course which is (at least on the rhetorical
level) not shaped primarily by particular
interests but a search for ‘what is good for
the country’.
This, however, presupposes that
the people subject to political institutions
think of themselves as parts of collective.
Why should we accept political measures
unfavourable to us as individuals? The
answer can not only be legal enforcement
– widespread disobedience to legal norms
leads to the partial or total breakdown of
regimes. This can be witnessed in the
places where informal mafia-like networks
often rule out legal arrangements. Total
breakdowns of democratic institutions
often occur in Africa, where states en-
compass people who think of themselves
primarily as members of tribes, not of a
political community. Unsurprisingly, auto-
cratic order has been more endurable in
such societies than the fragile institutions
of democracy (Horowitz 1985). What is
needed, then, is a framing of political dis-
course in terms of a collective that is con-
gruent with the reach of political institu-
tions – a ‘demos’.
Karl Deutsch and David Easton
have coined this the ‘political community’,
or, to be more precise, the sense of politi-
cal community (Deutsch 1954; Easton
1965: 177-189). The formulation and car-
rying through of political measures (and
thus the persistence of a political order)
depends on the mutual identification of
the citizens as members of a collective.
According to Easton, this sense of a po-
litical community is one component of his
category ‘diffuse support’ for the political
system. Diffuse support is primarily
shaped by socialisation in the family and
public education. Thus, changes in identi-
fication with the political collective are
very slow and only indirectly a conse-
quence of personal experience. If we
adopt this framework, it is clear that iden-
tification with Europe can only evolve
slowly with the succession of generations.
It only evolves if European institutions are
able to meet the expectation of its citizens
over a long time span. A second require-
ment for the ‘sense of a political commu-
nity’ (one not discussed by Easton) is the
symbolic construction of such a collective
in public discourse. In other words: public
discourse has to produce effective sym-
bols of unity. If a polity lacks a sense of
‘political community’, individual or par-
ticular loyalties are likely to reign in politi-
cal discourse. The domination of majority
tribes in African democratic systems is
one example. A similar logic might lead to
the proliferation of national interests in
European political discourse – as can
easily be observed with Euro-sceptic
claims in electoral campaigns for the
European parliament and for national
parliaments in EU member states. A ‘thin’
legitimacy of European institutions based
on their performance rather than a ‘thick’
identification with a European political
community might not suffice to prevent
particular logics from taking over (Scharpf
1999: 11-13).
Historically, the establishment of
political communities has been achieved
in the Western world with the invention of
‘nations’ (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983;
Smith 1991). The almost simultaneous
advent of both democracy and the nation-
state at the turn of the 18th to the 19th
century is no coincidence. And no wonder
that democratic regimes have only proven
stable where people think of themselves
as belonging to a national community. Is it
possible today to invent a European na-
tion, like the nations invented in the 19th
century in the Americas and in Europe?
Nations show several structural features,
only some of which are attainable on the
European level:
(1) National symbols like a flag
and anthems and rituals like coronations
and national holidays serve as effective
markers of unity (Billig 1995). A European
flag is already proudly waved, the Euro-
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pean anthem chanted. And no doubt other
symbols and rituals can be added without
much ado.
(2) The writing of national histo-
ries suggested common experiences and
a common destiny for a nation (Smith
1991: 63-70). Symbols were thus en-
dowed with traditions (Hobsbawm /
Ranger 1983). Of course it is possible
today to write a ‘European history’ and to
teach it in schools and at universities. The
early 19th century, however, was particu-
larly prone to invent such histories. It was
the time when people came to think of
societies as subject to change and history
(Koselleck 1979). When history was first
being written, it was written in terms of
national histories. To write a new Euro-
pean history would have to intertwine and
overcome these separate national histo-
ries and fuse them into something new
(Mikkeli 1998: 235-244). However, it will
not be easy to overcome the national
histories already firmly in place.
(3) Another crucial factor in the in-
vention of nations in the 19th century was
the establishment of a common high lan-
guage in public education and in the print
media (Anderson 1983: 18-19, 37-46;
Gellner 1983: 27-34). The formation of a
common European high language – be it
English or Esperanto – is rather unlikely in
the near future. Europe seems to be »lost
in translation« (Gubbins 2002) and a lin-
guistic (and consequential symbolic) unifi-
cation not in sight.
Both the cultural boundaries of
political communities and the symbols tied
to it were not prerequisites for the forma-
tion of nation-states, but at least partly a
consequence of it. National languages,
symbols, rituals, and identifications were
the result of a restructuring of cultural
meaning and social structure in the early
19th century – as was the parallel inven-
tion of mass politics (Tilly 1998). The na-
tion-state is a political-cultural unit. It has
dominated politics and culture for the past
200 years. On the one hand, it has set
effective boundaries for the construction
of cultural and political forms (and still
does). On the other hand, it has allowed
for the improbable arrangement of demo-
cratic institutions within its confines.
The resulting national geogra-
phies were not completely random – they
were partly set by pre-existing political
boundaries (most European and all
American countries). But another factor
was the pre-existing similarity of cultural
forms such as the vernaculars. Thus, the
multi-cultural Habsburg Empire did not
survive in the age of mass politics. It
would have been possible to construct a
Greater Germany – with Austria part of an
enlarged German nation. But the con-
struction of an Austro-Hungarian-Czech-
Slovakian-Croatian nation was out of
reach.
Europe today faces problems
similar to those of the late Habsburg Em-
pire. It has to integrate widely differing
cultures into its polity. In the historical-
ideological landscape of the 19th century,
this would have been almost impossible.
But today, with the historical experiences
of the 20th century past, and with increas-
ing scope of cultural flows through mass
media and mobilities, odds for a European
political integration look much better.
Transnational communication is facilitated
to the point, where social scientists are
discussing the matter of a global culture
(Featherstone 1990). Charles Tilly even
supposes the time of the nation-states to
be over, with larger units such as the
European Union becoming pre-eminent in
politics (2002: 168-169, 177, 186-187).
Yet, mass media and mobilities only pro-
vide the ground for a larger scope of poli-
tics. They do not substitute the construc-
tion of a ‘demos’ as the legitimising base
for European politics (García 1993; Fuchs
/ Klingemann 2002). The conditions for
the formation of a political community in
Europe differ from those for the emerging
nation-states in the 19th century. Hence
they need to be examined drawing on
general theories of identity formation and
on empirical data on current conditions.
The following sections are devoted to the
first of these tasks.
The involution of cultural networks
The formation of a European iden-
tity is a necessary step towards democra-
tisation of European politics, as was ar-
gued in the preceding section. Literature
on the salience and the possibility of a
European identity is already abundant.
However, these accounts lack a thorough
theoretical understanding of the formation
of political identities. The aim of this sec-
tion is to discuss the processes of Euro-
pean identity formation from the perspec-
tive of relationalism or phenomenological
network theory. Relational social theory is
a rather new paradigm, though its roots lie
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in the classical works of Georg Simmel,
Leopold von Wiese and Norbert Elias
(Emirbayer 1997). Only in the 90s, with
the important contributions of Harrison
White, Andrew Abbott, Mustafa Emir-
bayer, and Charles Tilly, it has become a
serious rival to rational choice, interpre-
tive, and systems theories.
The starting elements of network
theory are transactions between sites
such as human beings, organisations, or
states. In the course of transactions, ex-
pectations of future transactions arise and
form relations. These relations are the
basic building blocks of networks and bind
sites like human beings, organisations, or
states to interdependence (White 1995:
705, 711-712, 719; Tilly 2002: xii, 48-49).
Thus, every relation defines the identities
of the sites involved in its own terms – as
father, friend, colleague, or neighbour, as
competitor or business partner, as enemy
or friend. Identities of sites thus vary from
relation to relation – and the actors in-
volved are at pains at coordinating the
expectations tied to them. This logic leads
to considering identities always in their
relational context: the categorical identity
‘woman’ is defined against the identity
‘man’ – and both are negotiated in net-
works like the family or work organisa-
tions. Groups always construct their iden-
tity in contrast to and through the ex-
change with other groups (Barth 1969;
Tajfel 1982). The identities of states like
‘Germany’, ‘France’, ‘the US’ or ‘Turkey’
are to be understood in their relations to
other states – and on the basis of institu-
tional networks in their domain. These
relations, however, are not cultureless
structures. Instead, they are filled with
stories which define relationships and
identities (White 1992: 66-70; Somers
1994; Tilly 2002: 8-11, 26-42, 80). As
sketched above, nations are constructed
through the writing of national histories.
The same applies to a European identity.
In many important aspects, Euro-
pean identity does not resemble personal
identities or categories like ‘man’ or
‘woman’. Europe is not a unitary block for
which we only have to find a name and
establish expectations regarding its be-
haviour. On the contrary, Europe (like
every political or collective identity) is an
identity that symbolically cuts through
networks of persons and states and packs
them into one symbolic entity. Thus, it
resembles meso-networks like gangs,
families, social movements, and corporate
organisations. The unity of these phe-
nomena is only ensured through the es-
tablishment of a boundary of meaning that
separates its inner network of relations
from its outside. This boundary is not a
simple analytic feature of social phenom-
ena – it constitutes these phenomena in
an otherwise chaotic and entropic uni-
verse of social relations (Abbott 1995).
Boundaries make for the estab-
lishment and persistence of polities,
gangs, families, social movements and
corporate organisations in several ways:
(a) They serve as starting points for
the construction of network identities.
Claims of identity are always claims of
difference, too. Thus, to draw a symbolic
boundary around nodes and relations
means also to claim similarity and unity
within (Fuchs 2001: 272-276). Intertwined
with the construction of identity is the con-
struction of an Other – an Outgroup
against which the Ingroup defines itself
(Sumner 1906: 12-13). Once established,
boundary and identity are referred to and
continuously redrawn by symbols of unity
and difference, such as flags, uniforms,
names, etc..
(b) Boundary and identity serve as
focal points for communication. The col-
lective or political identity becomes an
address for communication. The identity
can be addressed both by members of the
collective and by other actors from out-
side. Based on experiences and on nor-
mative claims, expectations on the be-
haviour of the collective emerge. Thus,
the identity is established as an actor in a
wider network insofar as its behaviour
seems both coherent and impenetrable to
observers.
(c) The boundary excludes others
from its domain. The unity of a political
identity is based on the exclusion of oth-
ers, usually by means of categorical ex-
clusion, membership or, in the case of
states, of citizenship. This always intro-
duces a measure of asymmetry and ine-
quality between those inside and those
outside (Tilly 1998b).
(d) Expectations and norms of con-
duct are attached to the boundary, speci-
fying both the behaviour within the net-
work and that at its boundary. Thus,
gangs feature a special code of honour
with norms concerning behaviour between
gang members, to outsiders and to mem-
bers of rival gangs (Horowitz 1983).
(e) Through all of this, boundary
and identity establish means of control on
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two levels: claims of unity and difference
increasingly constrain relations within the
network. Furthermore, the capacity to act
as a collective or polity in a broader net-
work of other collectives or polities de-
pends on the consistency and efficiency
of its internal regime. Thus, identity and
control are twin concepts, one relying on
the other (White 1992).
Following Harrison White, this has
to be understood as the “involution” of a
network (1992: 35, 75; Fuhse 2003: 15-
21). This means: a network establishes its
own unity and structures through the
symbolic construction of symbolic
boundaries and identity. An involution
makes for inward orientation and self-
similarity of a network – it even pushes
towards homogenisation within. Involution
creates structure and regularity in an oth-
erwise unordered social universe. Involu-
tions can be observed in organisations.
These use identity and boundedness to
achieve a high level of hierarchy and for-
mal procedures. But it is also at work in
the amorph and more egalitarian struc-
tures of social movements and gangs.
Here, leadership is usually charismatic
rather than formalised. Markets and
states, too, have their foundations in in-
ward orientation and symbolically con-
structed self-similarity.
The larger the scope of such a
structure, the more it depends on the
generalisation of its identity and the norms
attached to it. Generalisation means:
large social structures have to become
independent of the particular nodes (ac-
tors) involved in order to ensure their per-
sistence. States, for example, feature a
high level of generalisation of their
boundaries and identities, whereas fami-
lies do not. Social movements and gangs
are located on an intermediate level of
generality. Organisations like firms show a
much higher level of generality than would
be expected if only looking at their scope.
They achieve this level through formal
procedures that govern their decisions
and access to membership and positions.
Thus, formal procedures are an important
factor for the generalisation of identities
and boundaries.
Depending on the level of formality,
involution not only creates an inside and
an outside in a network, but also a centre
and a periphery (Fuchs 2001: 281-284).
This can easily be observed in gangs and
in social movements. Here leaders show
a high level of commitment to the collec-
tive, demand the same from others, and
define the identity of the whole through
their actions. Followers, in contrast, are
often subject to cross-pressures and in-
fluence from outside. Thus, the centre
defines and reproduces the identity. The
periphery, in contrast, takes up irritations
from the network environment and is re-
sponsible for variation and adaptation.
This is true for cultural networks as it is for
social movements, gangs, and states
(Hannerz 1996: 70-78).
Obviously these general points on
the involution of networks apply to the
constitution of a European identity:
(a) As a number of observers have noted,
a clear defined boundary is a necessary
precondition for the formation of a Euro-
pean identity (Fuchs / Klingemann 2002:
19-22; Schlesinger 1989). Only if a sharp
dividing line is drawn, the European
‘demos’ can be symbolically installed as
the collective of those inside as opposed
to those outside. The ‘other’ necessary for
this is mainly found in the East: with Rus-
sia and Islam (Turkey in particular) often
used as negative reference points (Neu-
mann 1999). Other observers have ar-
gued for a more permeable, open border
of the European community (Zielonka
2002). But even if we apply a loose territo-
rial definition of Europe (with all its practi-
cal difficulties) – for the formation of a
European identity we need a clear-cut
picture of what Europe is not.
(b) At its institutional core, Europe can be
addressed by both citizens and other po-
litical entities. Appeals can be made to it,
but ‘Europe’ also appears as a symbolic
identity in the name of which political de-
mands are formulated. The importance of
such an imagined political community has
been stressed in the first section. Without
it, democratic discourse lacks an address
for demands and support.
(c) The issue of exclusion seems to pose
special problems in the case of Europe. It
is often depicted as a fortress in which
opportunities and riches are hoarded.
Thus, the coupling of its boundary with
material inequality makes this boundary a
matter of severe conflict, as in Norbert
Elias’s and John Scotson’s The Estab-
lished and the Outsiders (1965). The in-
troduction of a European citizenship is
one further step in this direction, without
entirely solving problems resulting from
citizens of one member state residing in
another (Neveu 2000).
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(d) Expectations and norms of conduct
appear in two forms in the European do-
main: Formalised norms comprise Euro-
pean law and regulations. Perhaps as
important are norms of cooperation in the
network, applying to the negotiations of
just these regulations. During the negotia-
tions of a European constitution, Spain
and especially Poland had to face infor-
mal pressures after taking an uncompro-
mising stand.
(e) One of Europe’s main tasks is to es-
tablish a certain amount of control within
its institutional domain as in international
politics. Countries like Great Britain still
insist on the primacy of their sovereignty.
And in international affairs, member states
are often eager to pursue their own ideas
and interests, unwilling to succumb to
compromises. Thus, Europe is an identity
still struggling to become an actor in its
own right and to gain control in its own
domain and in international politics. A
thorough generalisation and delegation of
power to the European level is all but
accomplished.
The involution of a European net-
work is thus on its way, but far from
achieved. Obstacles are to be found on
different levels: European culture is
marked by heterogeneity (Lützeler 2001).
Political discourse is still mainly organised
on the level of the nation state (Gerhards
1993; Grimm 1995). The same is true for
the mass media, where attempts to form a
European public have been fruitless
(Hjarvard 1993; Schlesinger 1993). Con-
sequently, European matters are often
discussed in terms of national interests
rather than in the name of the common
(European) good. In Easton’s terms: The
sense of political community is still mainly
national, rather than European (Scheuer
1999; Duchesne / Frognier 1995). From
this perspective, the British idea of a
‘European family of nations’ (Thatcher
1989) deserves more credit than it usually
gets. Politics is still articulated and organ-
ised on the level of the nation state. Cen-
tralisation not only brings opportunities of
better coordination. It also carries risks of
domination by particular interests, often
coined in national terms. But does it have
to be this way? Do we not witness a
changing discourse, with Europe becom-
ing an ever more important core idea?
Where are the boundaries of Europe?
The second section discussed the
determinants of a European identity for-
mation on a very general and abstract
level. The definition of a boundary was
identified as one of the most important
step towards a European identity. In this
section, I want to discuss this issue in
more detail in order to have a look at the
practical implications of the theoretical
account sketched above. There are vari-
ous possible ways to define the bounda-
ries of Europe: as has been argued, geo-
graphical and political boundaries in
themselves do not suffice to bring forth a
sense of political community. Rather, we
need to infuse these geo-political bounda-
ries with meaning. What Europe needs is
a cultural boundary which carries a
meaningful distinction from its outside.
This distinction may be religious, ideologi-
cal, or built on other aspects of culture.
Perhaps the most powerful argu-
ment on the matter comes from Samuel
Huntington. But he only articulated a posi-
tion hidden in much reasoning on Europe.
Huntington saw Europe as part of a
Western civilisation, marked by its “defin-
ing historical phenomena … : Roman
Catholicism, feudalism, the Renaissance,
the Reformation, overseas expansion and
colonisation, the Enlightenment, and the
emergence of the nation state” (1996:
139). According to Huntington: “Europe
ends where Western Christianity ends
and Islam and Orthodoxy begin … be-
tween Central Europe or Mitteleuropa and
Eastern Europe proper.” (1996: 158).
Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, the
Baltic countries and Finland thus fall on
the Western side of Huntington’s divide,
with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania,
Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey on
its Eastern side. Following Huntington, the
admission of Greece to the European
Union was already a mistake, Turkey is
out of question (1996: 162f). And apart
from Switzerland, Norway, and Catholic
Croatia, no further candidates should be
included in the European Union.
Huntington’s division is mainly built on
religious differences. But it is doubtful
whether religion matches with other as-
pects of culture. Religion may be a useful
marker of a boundary, but it is by no
means the only possible one.
Following phenomenological net-
work theory as outlined above,
Huntington’s civilisations have to be
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grasped as cultural networks. These focus
on certain core symbols such as religion
or ideologies, on common histories and
on opposition to other civilisations. Their
boundaries, however, are not clear-cut,
but fuzzy. Civilisations are differentiated
into core and periphery – and where one
civilisation’s periphery ends and the next
one’s starts, is impossible to establish.
Global culture is thus not as easily cate-
gorised as Huntington proposes. Instead,
cultural networks overlap and have fluid
boundaries (Hannerz 1992; Mol / Law
1994). Secondly, Huntington omits the
possibility of cultural processes and politi-
cal strategies not based on civilisational
identities. The cultural networks coined
‘civilisations’ by Huntington are not all
there is to culture, nor to politics. Instead
we find tendencies towards a global cul-
ture based on symbols and schemes de-
veloped in the North-West (that is: West-
ern Europe and North America). Part of
this process is the proliferation of indi-
vidualism and human rights throughout
the world across cultural networks. A
global politics based on the notion of hu-
man rights is thus not ruled out by civilisa-
tional cleavages. Rather, the two levels
intersect and make for a conundrum of
symbolic forms and political strategies.
One example of a more universal and
“enlightened” approach to culture and
international politics is the second strat-
egy of founding a European identity on
common values.
Values are an important aspect of
culture (van Deth / Scarbrough 1995).
Often Europe is defined in terms of the
values of the Enlightenment. In this view,
support for – broadly speaking – Western
values like individuality, democracy, toler-
ance and the separation of political from
religious matters distinguish Europe from
non-Western societies (Havel 1996).
Since tolerance would be one of Europe’s
defining features, religious differences
lose much of their weight. In contrast to
Huntington’s religious definition of Europe,
this definition is more focused on ideology
and civic traditions. The most encom-
passing attempt to measure differences
and similarities in ideology and values is
the World Values Survey, last conducted
in 2000/01. Ronald Inglehart has analysed
the World Values Survey extensively. He
recently reduced cultural differences in
the world on two dimensions, with the
extremes of traditional vs. secular-rational
values on one dimension and survival vs.
self-expression values on the other (1997:
92-100; Inglehart / Baker 2000: 23-31).
Both modernisation theory (as
heralded by Inglehart) and Huntington’s
theory of the clash of civilisations would
predict the Christian and relatively devel-
oped (Western) European societies to
clump in one area. The evidence does not
support this hypothesis. Western Euro-
pean countries do share self-expression
values (with the exception of Portugal) in
contrast to more survival oriented values
in African, Asian and Eastern European
countries. On the second dimension how-
ever, EU-member Ireland endorses rela-
tively traditional values (as do Spain and
Portugal). Sweden, Denmark, Norway and
West Germany show secular-rational
values. The new member states in East-
ern and Middle Europe (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia
and the Czech Republic are to be found
close to the secular-rational pole, too.
They show a marked tendency to survival
values though.
Consequently, Inglehart and
Baker seek to reconcile Huntington’s the-
ory of civilisations with Inglehart’s own
account of modernisation theory. Cultural
differences are thus explained by differ-
ences in socio-economic development
and in politico-religious traditions. Where
does this place Europe as a cultural area?
Inglehart and Baker do not identify one
European cluster, but five (2000: 29-40):
The English speaking countries (Ireland
and Great Britain are clumped with non-
European USA, Canada, Australia and
New Zealand), Protestant Europe (Ger-
many, Scandinavia, the Netherlands and
Switzerland), Catholic Europe (France,
Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria,
Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia and
Poland), the Baltic countries and Ortho-
dox Europe (with the ex-Soviet countries,
Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia).
The Czech Republic seems to be a devi-
ant case in 95-98, as was Poland in the
early 90s (Inglehart 1997: 93). Nicely lo-
cated in between these European clusters
we find the Confucian countries with
China, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.
This is explained by overlapping cultural
influences which lead to apparently similar
results under very different circum-
stances. All of this, however, does not
support the idea of a coherent and well-
bounded European culture.
Frank Ninkovich may be right
when he claims: “To be blunt: Europe
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does not and cannot have a common
culture.” (2001: 16) Perhaps he is also
right in claiming that a common European
culture is not the crucial question for the
European political integration. Up to now,
I have followed a model of an encom-
passing unitary culture in the tradition of
Clifford Geertz and Talcott Parsons. Ac-
cording to this view, a culture imposes
inescapable modes of thinking and acting
on human subjects. Such a culture is
definitely out of reach on the European
level, with languages, discourses, and
symbols firmly rooted on the national (or
even regional) level. Sociology has given
up this unitary and encompassing con-
ception of culture in the past twenty years.
Culture is now conceived of as a ‘tool-kit’
which provides models of thinking and
acting – but it does not prescribe them
(Swidler 1986; DiMaggio 1997). Such a
modular view on culture allows for the
existence of various cultural levels. Tur-
key, for example, can be thought of as
both Islamic and Western (to a certain
extent; Güvenç 1997). David Laitlin has
argued for the co-existence of one to
three cultural levels in linguistic matters
and in popular culture in the European
Union (2002).
Another important step in our
thinking about culture is away from
bounded units such as societies and na-
tions. In the age of global mass media
and increased mobility (of people, cultural
forms, and commodities), symbolic
meaning is no longer confined by territory,
tribes, or nation-states (Hannerz 1992;
Urry 2000). Instead we find complex cul-
tural configuration, overlapping and with-
out clear boundaries. One sign of this is
the differentiation of cultural networks in
cores and peripheries (see above). Cores
are easily identified. But where does the
periphery of one cultural network end and
the periphery of the next one begin? Ac-
cording to Samuel Huntington, France
and Germany form the core of the Euro-
pean Union, with an ‘inner grouping’ of
Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg
(1996: 135, 157). Here political power is
concentrated and the European identity is
defined. This pattern is confirmed by em-
pirical research on identification with
Europe: European identifiers figure most
prominently in the six oldest members
(France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Neth-
erlands, Germany, and – with the highest
level – Italy; Scheuer 1999: 35).1 The
boundaries of such a network involution,
in contrast, are difficult to establish. Even
Huntington claims: “Civilizations have no
clear-cut boundaries and no precise be-
ginning and endings.” (1996: 43) When
analysing cultural configurations, we
should acknowledge their fluid, multi-
layered and dynamic nature. The same
applies to identities: Identifications with
Europe and with a nation are not mutually
exclusive. Identities are multiple – not
unitary – and situational rather than ever-
salient (Smith 1992: 56, 58-59).
As has been noted above, cultural
networks based on different notions of
identity (such as religion or values) exist.
They are, however, not as stable, clear-
cut, and monolithic as Huntington sug-
gests. And they are accompanied (and
cross-cut) by cultural networks both larger
and smaller in scope – one of them being
the tendency towards Westernisation. The
crucial point is that this complex configu-
ration of cultural processes and identities
does usually not pose much of a problem
– even if it calls for contradictory political
strategies of interventionism or isolation-
ism with regard to political conflicts in
other parts of the world. But multi-layered
and fluid cultural topology becomes prob-
lematic with Europe trying to establish
itself as a politico-cultural entity. I have
argued in section 1 that a democratic
polity has to be based on some notion of
a common identity of its citizens as a
demos. If Europe is to step from a net-
work of nation-states to a political corpo-
rate based on democratic procedures, this
requires the re-ordering of the cultural
landscape in Europe.
Current debates show how diffi-
cult it is to establish a consensual defini-
tion of Europe and its limits. Part of the
reason is that the political boundary of
European Union is coupled to exclusion
from its perceived wealth. This material
inequality tied to the European / non-
European divide makes for its strongly
contested nature. Cultural arguments and
economic interests are often mingled and
conflated. Important though the economic
dimension may be, we have to under-
stand the cultural arguments in their own
logics. Thus the question remains: what
are the determinants of the formation of a
Europe as a politico-cultural entity? The
historical antecedent of the formation of
nation-states was achieved in very differ-
ent circumstances, with the establishing of
print-markets (as public spheres) and
public education as corner-stones. In-
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venting Europe as a political identity today
needs conscious steps in direction of a
well-defined vision of boundary and iden-
tity, with mass media and education once
again central in the structuring of public
discourse.
Notes
1. This may of course also be explained in
Easton’s terms (see above, 1.): in the old
member states, people have been subject
to European institutions for several dec-
ades – enough time to develop diffuse
support for the political community.
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